



Qualified Signature Validation Service Practice Statement and Policy

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1 Change History

Date	Version	Description of change
03/08/2018	1.0	Initial version for Dokobit Signature Validation Service
10/10/2019	1.2	Revamped document to meet the requirements set in ETSI TS 119 441
03/12/2019	1.5	Updates to become compliant to the recommended document structure (Annex A of ETSI TS 119 441 V1.1.1 (2018-08)) Associations to ISO27001 SoA document.
06/12/2019	1.6	Added signature validation service components and service architecture diagram, necessary changes for provision of Qualified Trust Service.
17/04/2020	1.7	Minor updates <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clarified 2.1.2 section - OID is for the Policy document• Added Qualified Trust Service Provider OID in 2.1.1• 4.1.3 and 4.3.1 changed to reflect that the user authenticates to the service using electronic identification means.• Added Notification to Supervisory Body clause in 2.4.3• Defined the use of a pseudonym in Signature Validation Reports in 4.1.2• Added SVS termination notice period in 3.12• Clarified a list of applicable legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania in 2.1

2 Introduction

2.1 Overview

This document describes the practices applied by Dokobit, UAB (hereafter Dokobit) in providing the **Qualified Signature and Seal Validation Services** in conformity with:

- *Regulation (EU) No 910/2014* of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC;
- Legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania:
 - Law of The Republic of Lithuania on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions
 - On the approval of the specification of the procedure for granting status of qualified trust service providers and qualified trust services and incorporation thereof in the national trusted list and provision of activity reports of qualified trust service providers by Order No. 1V-588 of the Director of the Communications Regulatory Authority on April 21, 2018
 - The Description of the Procedure for Reporting Breaches of the Security and/or Integrity of Trust Services approved by Order No. 1V-594 of the Director of the Communications Regulatory Authority on 4 June 2019
- European standard *ETSI EN 319 401 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI)*
 - General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers and other related requirements.

The structure of this document is compliant to the *Annex A of ETSI TS 119 441 V1.1.1 (2018-08)*.

2.1.1 TSP identification

Dokobit, UAB

Company code 301549834

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www.dokobit.com

The registered formal object identifier (OID) - 1.3.6.1.4.1.54720

2.1.2 Supported signature validation service policy

The Qualified Signature and Seal Validation Service Policy is identified with a registered formal object identifier (OID) 1.3.6.1.4.1.54720.1.1

2.2 Signature validation service components

2.2.1 SVS actors

Signature Validation Client (SVC)

- A software component that provides user interface for Driving Application used by Dokobit Service Subscribers.

Driving Application (DA)

- Application which provides signature validation functionality to Signature Validation Client.

Signature Validation Service Protocol (SVP)

- Secure communication channel for exchanging information with Signature Validation Service Server (SVSServ).

Signature Validation Service Server (SVSServ)

- The component that implements the signature validation protocol on the SVSP's side.

Signature Validation Application (SVA)


- A software component that is responsible for signature validation, which implements the validation algorithm and creates a signature validation report.

External Actors

- Other trust sources - Certification Authorities, Time-stamping authorities, European Trusted List providers, European Commission providing the list of Trusted Lists which are called to fulfil its purpose.

2.2.2 Service architecture

The diagram below displays the simplified Dokobit Qualified Validation Service architecture and involved actors.



2.3 Definitions and abbreviations

2.3.1 Definitions

Name	Abbreviation	Definition
eIDAS Regulation	eIDAS	Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
General Data Protection Regulation	GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
Information Security Management System	ISMS	Dokobit's certified Information Security Management System according to ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
Trust Service Provider	TSP	An entity which provides Trust Service.
Qualified Trust Service Provider	QTSP	An entity which provides one or more Qualified Trust Services and is granted the qualified status by the Supervisory Body.
Supervisory Body		The authority that is designated by a member state to carry out the supervisory activities over Trust Services and Trust Service Providers under eIDAS in the territory of that member state.

Name	Abbreviation	Definition
Dokobit Signature Validation Practice Statement	Dokobit PS	A statement of the practices that Dokobit employs in providing Trust Service.
Signature Validation Service	SVS	Trust Service for Signature and / or Seal Validation.
Relying Party		A natural or legal person that relies on Trust Service.
Subscriber		A legal or natural person bound by an agreement with Dokobit to any Subscriber obligations.
Certification Authority	CA	Qualified Trust Service Provider that issues certificates for electronic signatures and/or seals.

2.3.2 Abbreviations

DA	Driving Application
PoE	Proof of Existence
QES	Qualified Electronic Signature or Qualified Electronic Seal
AdES	Advanced Electronic Signature
AdES/QC	Advanced Electronic Signature created with a Qualified Certificate
(Q)SCD	Qualified Signature Creation Device
QSVSP	Qualified Signature Validation Service Provider
SD	Signer's Document
SDO	Signed Data Object
SDR	Signed Document Representation
SVA	Signature Validation Application
SVP	Signature Validation Protocol

SVR	Signature Validation Report
SVSP	Signature Validation Service Provider
SVSServ	Signature Validation Service Server
TSA	Time stamping Authority
VPR	Signature Validation PROcess
OID	Object Identifier
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
HSM	Hardware Security Module

2.4 Policies and Practices

2.4.1 Organization administrating the TSP documentation

This document is administered by Dokobit.

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2.4.2 Contact Person

The contact person for the management of this document shall be the Compliance Manager of Dokobit.

Further information can be requested via email compliance@dokobit.com.

2.4.3 TSP documentation applicability

Signature Validation Service Practice statement

Dokobit is responsible for the management of Dokobit Validation Service Practice Statement. This document shall be approved by the Management Board and made publicly at Dokobit Compliance website (<https://www.dokobit.com/compliance>).

Dokobit shall notify Supervisory body about any changes in the provision of qualified trust services without undue delay but no later than 3 working days. Dokobit shall notify Supervisory body about the planned termination of the qualified trust service no less than 3 months prior to the the termination of qualified trust service.

Notification to Supervisory Body shall be sent without undue delay and not later than 3 workdays after any changes in Dokobit Validation Service Practice Statement.

Subscribers and Relying parties shall only take into account the effective version of Dokobit PS as of the time of using the services provided by Dokobit. Dokobit PS along with enforcement dates is published no less than 30 days prior to taking effect.

Information security policy

Dokobit has implemented an Information Security Management System (ISMS) according to ISO/IEC-27001:2013 standard. Dokobit has achieved certification of ISMS according to ISO/IEC-27001:2013 standard with the certification scope of “Cloud-based services for e-signing, e-sealing, e-identification, validation of e-signature and e-seal, and related software development, delivery and support.”

Dokobit has implemented all necessary controls required by eIDAS and GDPR regulations and corresponding standards (i.e. ETSI EN 319 401) into ISMS.

Dokobit Chief Executive Officer approves policies and practices related to information security.

Terms of Service

Dokobit makes Terms of Services as well as Data Processing agreement available on Dokobit Compliance website (<https://www.dokobit.com/compliance>).

3 Trust Service Management And Operation

Dokobit has implemented an Information Security Management System according to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard and has achieved *ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certification* by an accredited international certification body. Qualified Signature and Seal Validation Services are within the scope of this certification. The paragraphs below summarize management and operations of trust service, including security controls applied.

3.1 Internal organization

Dokobit complies with all legal obligations applicable to the provisioning of its Trust Services. It conducts its operations in line with the adopted policies and practices. Dokobit ensures that all requirements defined in ISO27001:2013 Statement of Applicability and this Practice Statement are implemented and remain applicable to the Trust Services provided.

The provision of Trust Services is subject to an external audit performed at least every 24 months by a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB).

3.1.1 Organization reliability

Dokobit has the necessary financial stability and resources for operation in accordance with this document. Dokobit maintains insurance of its civil liability in accordance with the applicable legislation, to cover obligations arising from its operations and in line with Article 13 of eIDAS regulation. Dokobit may provide more information about specific organization reliability measures upon special legitimate request from concerning party.

3.1.2 Segregation of duties

Implemented and certified Information Security Management System according to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 ensures that segregation of duties is verified and maintained. More specifically: Information security manager (ISM) and internal auditor roles are separated. More specifically:

A. 6.1.2	Segregation of duties	ISM and internal auditor roles are separated. Also, the Management group is established to deal with major issues. Four eye principle is introduced where the organization sees higher risks. In addition to this, Secure software development and deployment policy with source code reviewers is in place.
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3.2 Human resources

Implemented and certified Information Security Management System according to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 ensures that Dokobit has implemented all necessary controls for secure operations. The employees and contractors receive adequate training and have all the necessary experience for carrying out the duties specified in employment or contractor’s agreements as defined in Dokobit HR Management Policy. More specifically:

A.7.1	Prior to employment	
A.7.1.1	Screening	Management group performs screening according to relevant laws and regulations. Employees shall provide a clean criminal record certificate.
A.7.1.2	Terms and conditions of employment	All employees sign an employment contract, NDA and all relevant ISMS documentation.
A.7.2	During employment	
A.7.2.1	Management responsibilities	Management governs and supports ISMS activities. Details are provided in Information security policy and management practice document.
A.7.2.2	Information security awareness, education and training	Training and briefings are provided in Training and awareness plan. Secure development practices, including awareness, are provided in Secure development policy.
A.7.2.3	Disciplinary process	NDAs provide specialized clauses regarding disciplinary actions. Disciplinary action may be initiated by the ISM (Information classification policy).
A.7.3	Termination and change of employment	
A.7.3.1	Termination or change of employment responsibilities	According to NDAs with employees, confidentiality statements remain valid after the termination of employment. The supplier security policy defines recommendations on what information security aspects are recommended to be addressed in contracts.

3.3 Asset management

3.3.1 General requirements

Dokobit maintains up-to-date lists of assets, incl. information assets. Risk Management is based on the identification of assets. Risk Assessment is aligned with the identification of assets and threats are identified as related to assets using elaborate mapping. This is a part of Dokobit certified ISMS - i.e. Dokobit Acceptable Use Policy, Dokobit Information Classification Policy and Dokobit Risk Management Methodology. More specifically:

A.8.1	Responsibility for assets	
A.8.1.1	Inventory of assets	Internal table "List of assets" represents asset owners in both dimensions: process and tenable assets.
A.8.1.2	Ownership of assets	Table "List of assets".
A.8.1.3	Acceptable use of assets	Requirements for acceptable use of assets are declared in Acceptable use policy.
A.8.1.4	Return of assets	Return of assets is considered in NDAs, Acceptable use policy and Supplier security policy.

3.3.2 Media handling

Media containing sensitive information is handled securely and in accordance with ISMS Dokobit Information Classification Policy and Dokobit Operating Procedures for ICT. More specifically:

A.8.3	Media handling	
A.8.3.1	Management of removable media	Information Classification Policy defines how to handle information, including information in the paper, electronic, electronic within information systems, emails, (removable) storage.
A.8.3.2	Disposal of media	Disposal and destruction requirements are located in Operating procedures for information and communication technology document.
A.8.3.3	Physical media transfer	Information Classification Policy and Operating Procedures for information and communication technology document define rules on how to deal with media transfer.

3.4 Access control

Dokobit Access Control Policy which is a part of Dokobit certified ISMS ensures that system access shall be limited to authorized individuals and all necessary controls for secure access control are implemented. More specifically:

A.9	Access control	
A.9.1	Business requirements of access control	
A.9.1.1	Access control policy	The basic principle is that access to all systems, networks, services and information is forbidden (“denied by default”), unless expressly permitted (“need to know”) to individual users or groups of users. More details are available in the Dokobit Access control policy.
A.9.1.2	Access to networks and network services	The basic principle is that access to all systems, networks, services and information is forbidden (“denied by default”), unless expressly permitted (“need to know”) to individual users or groups of users. More details are available in the Dokobit Access control policy.
A.9.2	User access management	
A.9.2.1	User registration and de-registration	(Electronic) access provision rules (including de-registration) is located in Access control policy.
A.9.2.2	User access provisioning	(Electronic) access provision rules is located in the Access control policy. Requirements for corporate account security settings are also located in this document.
A.9.2.3	Management of privileged access rights	Privileges for each system (asset) may be granted by their respective owners only or ISM. Access control policy.
A.9.2.4	Management of secret authentication information of users	(Electronic) access provision rules located in Access control policy describes how secret authentication information should be managed by users
A.9.2.5	Review of user access rights	Regular review of access rights is defined in Access control policy.
A.9.2.6	Removal or adjustment of access rights	Access rights are being removed or adjusted by following Access control policy.
A.9.3	User responsibilities	

A.9	Access control	
A.9.3.1	Use of secret authentication information	Credentials handling responsibilities are being described in the Acceptable use policy.
A.9.4	System and application access control	
A.9.4.1	Information access restriction	Information classification policy defines information access restriction and provision procedures.
A.9.4.2	Secure log-on procedures	(Electronic) access provision rules in Access control policy requires that access to the internal, external or third party service/application should be provided by using federated corporate account authentication service.
A.9.4.3	Password management system	Requirements for corporate account security settings are listed in the Access control policy
A.9.4.4	Use of privileged utility programs	There is the limitation in Acceptable use policy that users must not take part in activities which may be used to bypass information system security controls.
A.9.4.5	Access control to software source code	<p>The software source code is intellectual property and is accessible on a basis need-to-know only. An information classification policy defines authorized persons and access restrictions to business secrets (program source code is a part of business secrets).</p> <p>Physically source code is stored in Source Code Versioning system, where ISM provides key-based access to required sources.</p>

3.5 Cryptographic controls

Dokobit Policy on the use of cryptographic controls which is a part of Dokobit certified ISMS ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms, keys sizes and cryptographic devices in the provision of all Dokobit Services.

A.10	Cryptography	
A.10.1	Cryptographic controls	
A.10.1.1	Policy on the use of cryptographic controls	Policy on the use of cryptographic controls.

A.10	Cryptography	
A.10.1.2	Key management	Policy on the use of cryptographic controls.

3.6 Physical and environmental security

Dokobit certified ISMS covers this section via Dokobit Supplier Security Policy, Dokobit Procedures for working in secure areas and Dokobit Operating Procedures for ICT. More specifically:

A.11	Physical and environmental security	
A.11.1	Secure areas	
A.11.1.1	Physical security perimeter	Secure areas are described in document Procedures for working in secure areas.
A.11.1.2	Physical entry controls	Right of access and entry controls are described in document Procedures for working in secure areas.
A.11.1.3	Securing offices, rooms and facilities	Security controls for office premises are evaluated during the risk assessment and necessary actions are taken when higher than tolerable risks area being evaluated.
A.11.1.4	Protecting against external and environmental threats	Security controls for office premises are evaluated during the risk assessment and necessary actions are taken when higher than tolerable risks area being evaluated.
A.11.1.5	Working in secure areas	Rules for secure areas are described in the document Procedures for working in secure areas.
A.11.1.6	Delivery and loading areas	Public access areas including delivery and loading zone (entrance to the office building) are controlled, security guard.
A.11.2	Equipment	
A.11.2.1	Equipment siting and protection	Highly sensitive in-house equipment is located in secure areas.
A.11.2.2	Supporting utilities	Devices for uninterruptible power supply are installed for source code and backup servers.
A.11.2.3	Cabling security	Security controls for cabling security are evaluated during the risk assessment and necessary actions are taken when higher than tolerable risks area being evaluated.

A.11	Physical and environmental security	
A.11.2.4	Equipment maintenance	Acceptable use policy describes that equipment maintenance shall be done in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
A.11.2.5	Removal of assets	Acceptable use policy defines the procedure how assets may be taken off-site.
A.11.2.6	Security of equipment and assets off-premises	Rules how assets should be handled and secured outside the office premises are declared in Acceptable use policy.
A.11.2.7	Secure disposal or reuse of equipment	Disposal and destruction of equipment and media are described in the document Operating procedures for information and communication technology.
A.11.2.8	Unattended user equipment	Acceptable use policy and Clear desk and clear screen policy.
A.11.2.9	Clear desk and clear screen policy	Acceptable use policy and Clear desk and clear screen policy.

3.7 Operation security

Dokobit certified ISMS covers this section via Dokobit Operating Procedures for ICT, Dokobit Secure Development Policy, Dokobit Supplier Security Policy, Dokobit Incident Management Procedure, Dokobit Acceptable Use Policy, Dokobit BYOD Policy and Dokobit Personal Data Protection policy. More specifically:

A.12	Operations security	
A.12.1	Operational procedures and responsibilities	
A.12.1.1	Documented operating procedures	Document Operating procedures for information and communication technology contains documented operating procedures.
A.12.1.2	Change management	Change management procedure is defined in the document Operating procedures for information and communication technology. In order to ensure the proper functioning of the validation service, Dokobit runs positive and negative tests (such as XAdES, PAdES, CAdES signature validation tests, functionality logic, user-interface, security tests etc) after each change for validating service functionality.

A.12	Operations security	
A.12.1.3	Capacity management	<p>Capacity is managed through service/application logging and monitoring. More details are available at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operating procedures for information and communication technology, section Service monitoring • Secure development policy, section Checklist for service/application logging and monitoring
A.12.1.4	Separation of development, testing and operational environments	The management group is responsible to separate and maintain separate development, testing, and production environments. There are more restrictions and recommendations written in Secure development policy.
A.12.2	Protection from malware	
A.12.2.1	Controls against malware	Confidential. Company employs various security levels for protection against malware.
A.12.3	Backup	
A.12.3.1	Information backup	Backups are described in Operating procedures for information and communication technology document.
A.12.4	Logging and monitoring	
A.12.4.1	Event logging	Secure engineering principles and requirements in Secure development policy describe how logging should be implemented and who is responsible for it.
A.12.4.2	Protection of log information	Secure engineering principles and requirements in Secure development policy describe how logging should be implemented and who is responsible for it
A.12.4.3	Administrator and operator logs	Secure engineering principles and requirements in Secure development policy describe how logging should be implemented and who is responsible for it
A.12.4.4	Clock synchronization	Confidential
A.12.5	Control of operational software	

A.12	Operations security	
A.12.5.1	Installation of software on operational systems	In order to install any software in information systems change management has to be applied which is described in document Operating procedures for information and communication technology.
A.12.6	Technical vulnerability management	
A.12.6.1	Management of technical vulnerabilities	ISM is responsible to manage technical vulnerabilities. Technical vulnerability management is a part of document Operating procedures for information and communication technology.
A.12.6.2	Restrictions on software installation	Acceptable use policy defines that it is forbidden to install illegal software or software from not trusted sources on any devices used by the company.
A.12.7	Information systems audit considerations	
A.12.7.1	Information systems audit controls	Information system controls are being evaluated during risk assessment exercises, which are performed early or sooner in case of major changes occur.

3.8 Network security

Dokobit certified ISMS covers this section via Dokobit Operating Procedures, Dokobit Acceptable Use Policy.

More specifically:

A.13.1	Network security management	
A.13.1.1	Network controls	All ports and protocols are prohibited unless there is a "need-to-use".
A.13.1.2	Security of network services	All ports and protocols are prohibited unless there is a "need-to-use". Network security management is a part of document Operating procedures for information and communication technology.
A.13.1.3	Segregation in networks	The network is segregated between production (IaaS), Backup and Office environments.

3.9 Incident management

This section is covered by Dokobit certified ISMS via Dokobit Incident Management Procedure. More specifically:

A.16.1	Management of information security incidents and improvements	
A.16.1.1	Responsibilities and procedures	Incident management procedure. Management group is responsible for preparation activities to deal with possible incidents. It includes an assurance that appropriate logging and monitoring (See Secure development policy for details) is in place, as well as lessons learned from previous incidents, are integrated into the DOKOBIT operations.
A.16.1.2	Reporting information security events	Incident management procedure. There are two parts: detection and reporting.
A.16.1.3	Reporting information security weaknesses	Incident management procedure. Section Reporting an incident. It contains security weaknesses and events also.
A.16.1.4	Assessment of and decision on information security events	Incident management procedure. Section Containment, eradication, and recovery.
A.16.1.5	Response to information security incidents	Incident management procedure. Section Containment, eradication, and recovery.
A.16.1.6	Learning from information security incidents	Incident management procedure. Section Post-incident activity.
A.16.1.7	Collection of evidence	Incident management procedure. Section Containment, eradication, and recovery.

3.10 Collection of evidence

Dokobit applies the requirements specified in clause 7.10 of ETSI EN 319 401 with respect to the collection of evidence. These records will only be disclosed to law enforcement authorities under court order and to persons with the legitimate request. Such information is managed in line with Dokobit Personal Data Protection Policy which is a part of Dokobit certified ISMS.

3.11 Business continuity management

Dokobit has implemented a business continuity management framework, which is a part of certified Dokobit ISMS and covers procedures of risk assessment, responses to incidents, disasters and their recovery plans including exercises.

The plans include all resources and processes necessary for the recovery and covers all the information security aspects of business continuity management. The objective of such plans is to complete the recovery of services within the set recovery time objective (RTO). Recovery plans are tested annually. More specifically:

A.17.1	Information security continuity	
A.17.1.1	Planning information security continuity	Disaster recovery plan. The purpose of the Disaster recovery plan is to define precisely how DOKOBIT will recover its services within set deadlines in the case of a disaster or other catastrophic event identified during the risk assessment. The objective of this plan is to complete the recovery of services within the set recovery time objective (RTO).
A.17.1.2	Implementing information security continuity	Disaster recovery plan.
A.17.1.3	Verify, review and evaluate information security continuity	Disaster recovery plan.
A.17.2	Redundancies	
A.17.2.1	Availability of information processing facilities	Risk related to the availability of the services are identified during the risk assessment. Necessary actions are planned.

3.12 TSP Termination and termination plans

Dokobit has up-to-date termination plan in accordance with clause 7.12 of ETSI EN 319 401.

Dokobit has additional third-party warranties to cover the costs to fulfil these minimum requirements in case the TSP goes bankrupt, or for other reasons is unable to cover the costs by itself.

Dokobit reserves the right to terminate the provisioning of the Signature Validation Service by informing Customers and Supervisory body with a minimum notice of 3 months.

Reference: *Dokobit Trust Services Termination Plan*

3.13 Compliance

This section is covered by certified Dokobit ISMS via the Dokobit Procedure for Identification of Requirements. The procedure defines the process of identification of interested parties, as well as legal, regulatory, contractual and other requirements and responsibilities for their fulfilment. More specifically:

A.18.1	Compliance with legal and contractual requirements	
A.18.1.1	Identification of applicable legislation and contractual requirements	Procedure for identification of requirements.
A.18.1.2	Intellectual property rights	It is part of Business secrets defined by the board of management. It is regulated according to the EU and local legislation.
A.18.1.3	Protection of records	Procedure for document and record control.
A.18.1.4	Privacy and protection of personally identifiable information	Service/processes/asset owners are responsible for each individual requirement identification (including contractual) and compliance within the asset. More information could be found in Procedure for identification of requirements.
A.18.1.5	Regulation of cryptographic controls	Policy on the use of cryptographic controls.

4 Signature Validation Service Design

The service may only be used by Dokobit contractual customers. The Service can only be accessed using defined interfaces and applications published by the validation service provider.

The user of the Service is obligated to protect the Service interface from unauthorized use and provide appropriate security when using the Services. This applies to any interface used to access the Service.

This Interface means, in particular, the web application for using the Service or any application or integration interface supplied exclusively by Dokobit or an integrator specified by the Service provider.


4.1 Signature validation process requirements

Dokobit validation service procedures for establishing whether an electronic signature or electronic seal is technically valid relay on the process described in ETSI TS 119 102 [ETSI119-102].

The following sections explain the way Dokobit validation service performs individual components of validation procedures, indicated the processes occurring and constraints. When no specific requirement is set in the present document, requirements and rules from ETSI TS 119 102 clauses 5 shall apply in their entirety.

When specific requirements and rules are set in the present specification, they shall prevail over the corresponding requirements from ETSI TS 119 102. In case of discrepancies between the present specifications and specifications from ETSI TS 119 102, the present specifications shall prevail.

4.1.1 Signature validation model



According to the conceptual model of Signature Validation defined in the referred specification, Dokobit Validation Service acts as a SVA. The SVA is called by the Driving Application (DA), to which it has to return the results of the validation process, in the form of a validation report.

Driving Application (DA) for Dokobit Validation service could be:

- Dokobit Portal;
- Dokobit Gateway;
- Dokobit Validation Service API.

Dokobit Validation service accepts only one file for validation which should contain signatures and signed content files in it.

4.1.2 Status indication of the signature validation process and signature validation report

Dokobit validation service provides a comprehensive report of the validation, allowing the DA to inspect details of the decisions made during validation and investigate the detailed causes for the status indication provided by the service.

Dokobit Portal and Dokobit Gateway present the report in a way meaningful to the user – human-readable HTML page.

The signature validation process output contains:

- list of signatures;
- a status indicating the results of the signature validation process;
- errors describing why the signature is invalid (TOTAL-FAILED) or warnings describing why SVS was unable to determine the signature status (INDETERMINATE);
- an indication of the policy which the signature has been validated;
- the use of any pseudonym is clearly indicated to the relying party if a pseudonym was used at the time of signing/sealing;

According to the algorithm specified in ETSI TS 119 102-1, the signature validation status can be:

Table 1 Validation report structure and semantics

Status indication	Semantics	Associated Validation report data
TOTAL-PASSED	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-PASSED based on the following considerations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the cryptographic checks of the signature succeeded (including checks of hashes of individual data objects that have been signed indirectly); any constraints applicable to the signer's identity certification have been positively validated (i.e. the signing certificate consequently has been found trustworthy); and the signature has been positively validated against the validation constraints and hence is considered conformant to these constraints. 	The validation process outputs the signing certificate, used in the validation process, together with specific signed attribute if present and considered validation evidences.
TOTAL-FAILED	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because the cryptographic checks of the signature failed (including checks of hashes of individual data objects that have been signed indirectly) or it has been proven that the generation of the signature took place after the revocation of the signing certificate.	The validation process outputs additional information to explain the TOTAL-FAILED indication for each of the validation constraints that have been taken into account and for which a negative result occurred.
INDETERMINATE	The available information is insufficient to ascertain the signature to be TOTAL-PASSED or TOTAL-FAILED	The validation process outputs additional information to explain the INDETERMINATE indication and to help the verifier to identify what data is missing to complete the validation process.

In addition to the main status, the signature validation report also includes secondary indication with the following semantics:

Table 2. Validation report structure and semantics

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
TOTAL-FAILED	FORMAT_FAILURE	The validation process shall provide any information available why parsing of the signature failed.	The signature is not conformant to one of the base standards to the extent that the cryptographic verification building block is unable to process it.
	HASH_FAILURE	The validation process shall provide: An identifier (s) (e.g. an URI or OID) uniquely identifying the element within the signed data object (such as the signature attributes, or the SD) that caused the failure.	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because at least one hash of a signed data object(s) that has been included in the signing process does not match the corresponding hash value in the signature.
	SIG_CRYPTO_FAILURE	The validation process shall output: The signing certificate used in the validation process.	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because the signature value in the signature could not be verified using the signer's public key in the signing certificate.
	REVOKED	<p>The validation process shall provide the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The certificate chain used in the validation process. The time and, if available, the reason of revocation of the signing certificate. 	<p>The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the signing certificate has been revoked; and there is proof that the signature has been created after the revocation time.

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
	EXPIRED	The process shall output: The validated certificate chain	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because there is proof that the signature has been created after the expiration date (notAfter) of the signing certificate
	NOT_YET_VALID	•	The signature validation process results into TOTAL-FAILED because there is proof that the signature was created before the issuance date (notBefore) of the signing certificate.
INDETERMINATE	SIG_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE	The validation process shall provide: The set of constraints that have not been met by the signature.	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because one or more attributes of the signature do not match the validation constraints.
	CHAIN_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE	<p>The validation process shall output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The certificate chain used in the validation process. • The set of constraints that have not been met by the chain. 	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the certificate chain used in the validation process does not match the validation constraints related to the certificate.
	CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_GENERATIONAL_FAILURE	The process shall output: Additional information regarding the reason.	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the set of certificates available for chain validation produced an error for an unspecified reason.

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
	CRYPTO_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE	<p>The process shall output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of the material (signature, certificate) that is produced using an algorithm or key size below the required cryptographic security level. • If known, the time up to which the algorithm or key size were considered secure. 	<p>The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because at least one of the algorithms that have been used in material (e.g. the signature value, a certificate...) involved in validating the signature, or the size of a key used with such an algorithm, is below the required cryptographic security level, and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • this material was produced after the time up to which this algorithm/key was considered secure (if such a time is known); and • the material is not protected by a sufficiently strong time-stamp applied before the time up to which the algorithm/key was considered secure (if such a time is known).
	POLICY_PROCESSING_ERROR	<p>The validation process shall provide additional information on the problem.</p>	<p>The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because a given formal policy file could not be processed for any reason (e.g. not accessible, not parse-able, digest mismatch, etc.).</p>
	SIGNATURE_POLICY_NOT_AVAILABLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	<p>The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the electronic document containing the details of the policy is not available.</p>
	TIMESTAMP_ORDER_FAILURE	<p>The validation process shall output the list of time-stamps that do not respect the ordering constraints.</p>	<p>The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because some constraints on the order of signature time-stamps and/or signed data object(s) time-stamps are not respected.</p>
	NO_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_FOUND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	<p>The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the signing certificate cannot be identified.</p>

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
	NO_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FOUND	•	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because no certificate chain has been found for the identified signing certificate.
	REVOKED_NO_POE	<p>The validation process shall provide the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The certificate chain used in the validation process. • The time and the reason of revocation of the signing certificate. 	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the signing certificate was revoked at the validation date/time. However, the Signature Validation Algorithm cannot ascertain that the signing time lies before or after the revocation time.
	REVOKED_CA_NO_POE	<p>The validation process shall provide the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The certificate chain which includes the revoked CA certificate. • The time and the reason of revocation of the certificate. 	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because at least one certificate chain was found but an intermediate CA certificate is revoked.
	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_NOT_REVOKED	•	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the signing certificate is expired or not yet valid at the validation date/time and the Signature Validation Algorithm cannot ascertain that the signing time lies within the validity interval of the signing certificate. The certificate is known not to be revoked.

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_NO_POE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because the signing certificate is expired or not yet valid at the validation date/time and the Signature Validation Algorithm cannot ascertain that the signing time lies within the validity interval of the signing certificate.
INDETERMINATE	CRYPTO_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE_NO_POE	<p>The process shall output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of the material (signature, certificate) that is produced using an algorithm or key size below the required cryptographic security level. <p>If known, the time up to which the algorithm or key size were consider secure.</p>	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because at least one of the algorithms that have been used in objects (e.g. the signature value, a certificate, etc.) involved in validating the signature, or the size of a key used with such an algorithm, is below the required cryptographic security level, and there is no proof that this material was produced before the time up to which this algorithm/key was considered secure.
	NO_POE	<p>The validation process shall identify at least the signed objects for which the POEs are missing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The validation process should provide additional information on the problem. 	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because a proof of existence is missing to ascertain that a signed object has been produced before some compromising event (e.g. broken algorithm).

Main indication	Sub-indication	Associated Validation report data	Semantics
	TRY_LATER	The validation process shall output the point of time, where the necessary revocation information is expected to become available.	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because not all constraints can be fulfilled using available information. However, it may be possible to do so using additional revocation information that will be available at a later point of time.
	SIGNED_DATA_NOT_FOUND	The process should output when available: The identifier(s) (e.g. an URI) of the signed data that caused the failure.	The signature validation process results into INDETERMINATE because signed data cannot be obtained.

- Dokobit assigns an object identifier (OID) to each policy and supports two validation policies:

Validation Policy	Object Identifier
QES validation policy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stricter validation: requires valid qualified electronic signatures and seals to pass. Qualified electronic signatures have the equivalent legal effect of handwritten signatures according to EU Regulation No 910/2014 (eIDAS). Default in Dokobit Validation Service API; 	1. 3.6.1.4.1.54720.1.2
AdES validation policy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline validation: checks that the document hasn't been altered and provides necessary information about the legal type and validity of electronic signatures and seals according to EU Regulation No 910/2014 (eIDAS). Default in Dokobit Portal and Dokobit Gateway 	1. 3.6.1.4.1.54720.1.3

- The signature validation service does not accept several sources of validation policy;
- The signature validation policy may not be ignored and replaced by signature validation roles according to the protocol specified in ETSI TS 119 442;
- The validation process ensures that the signature validation policy that is used corresponds to the strategy defined in the SVS policy or the terms and conditions of use of signature validation service;
- The strategy defined in the SVS policy or the terms and conditions of use of the SVS follows the following principles:

- For the same input including validation policy, signature validation service will return the same output;
- SVS may accept different elements as proof of existence for a signature.

4.1.3 Validation process

Dokobit validation service supports the Validation Process for Basic Signatures and the Validation Process for Signatures with Timestamp and Signatures with Long-Term Validation Data. There is no possibility to specify the process to be used by the DA for other services. When validating an instance of a signature or a seal, Dokobit validation service proceed as follows:

1. SVA performs the Validation Process for all signatures not depending on their level.
2. When the validation status returned by the selected validation process returned the status indication PASSED, the SVA provides the status indication TOTAL-PASSED to the DA
3. When the validation status returned by the selected validation process returned the status indication FAILED, the SVA provides the status indication TOTAL-FAILED to the DA.
4. Otherwise, the SVA provides the status indication INDETERMINATE.

The following electronic signature and electronic seal formats apply in the context of the EU legislation [EU 2015/1506] and are supported by Dokobit validation service:

1. ETSI TS 103 171 V2.1.1 (2012-03) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XAdES Baseline Profile
2. ETSI TS 103 172 V2.2.2 (2013-04) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES Baseline Profile
3. ETSI TS 103 173 V2.1.1 (2012-03) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); CAdES Baseline Profile
4. ETSI TS 103 174 V2.2.1 (2013-06) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); ASiC Baseline Profile

Validation process in Dokobit portal comprises of the following steps:

1. The client authenticates to the Service using electronic identification means;
2. The user selects a validation policy and uploads an electronically signed document. Dokobit validation service restricts validation policy to be one of QES validation policy or AdES validation policy;
3. Dokobit validation service validates document according to ETSI TS 119 102-1 and using selected validation policy.

4. The report is presented to the client;

Validation process in Dokobit Gateway and Dokobit validation service API comprises of the following steps:

1. The client uploads an electronically signed document and chooses the desired validation policy. Dokobit validation service restricts validation policy to be one of QES validation policy or AdES validation policy;
2. Dokobit validation service validates document according to ETSI TS 119 102-1 and using selected validation policy.
3. The report is returned in JSON response which contains a list of signatures and list of signature validation errors or warnings.

4.1.4 Validation constraints for electronically signed documents

Dokobit validation service validation constraints are defined explicitly in system-specific control data and by the implementation itself.

Any validation constraints not implied by the implementation originate from the signature content itself directly (included in the signed attributes) or indirectly, i.e. by reference to an external document, provided in a machine-processable form. Additional constraints could be provided by the DA to the SVA via parameters selected by the application or the user.

This additional constraint could be provided after mutual agreement between Dokobit validation service provider and relying party.

General Constraints

Dokobit validation service supports the following general constraints.

Constraint	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
Maximum file size of supported documents	300MB (Dokobit Validation Service API, Dokobit Gateway), 100MB (Dokobit Portal)

X.509 Validation Constraints

Dokobit validation service supports following X.509 validation constraints which indicate requirements for use in the certificate path validation process as specified in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [ETSI 119 172-1], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 row m.

Constraint(s)	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
<p>m)1. X509CertificateValidationConstraints: This set of constraints indicates requirements for use in the certificate path validation process as defined in IETF RFC 5280. These constraints may be different for different certificate types (e.g. certificates issued to signer, to CAs, to OCSP responders, to CRL Issuers, to Time-Stamping Units). Semantic for a possible set of requirement values used to express such requirements is defined as follows:</p> <p>(m)1.1. SetOfTrustAnchors: This constraint indicates a set of acceptable trust anchors (TAs) as a constraint for the validation process.</p>	EU TSL
<p>(m)1.2. CertificationPath: This constraint indicates a certification path required to be used by the SVA for validation of the signature. The certificate path is of length 'n' from the trust anchor (TA) down to the certificate used in validating a signed object (e.g. the signer's certificate or a time stamping certificate). This constraint can include the path to be considered or indicate the need for considering the path provided in the signature if any.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (m)1.3. user-initial-policy-set: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (c) • (m)1.4. initial-policy-mapping-inhibit: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (e) • (m)1.5. initial-explicit-policy: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (f) • (m)1.6. initial-any-policy-inhibit: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (g) • (m)1.7. initial-permitted-subtrees: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (h) • (m)1.8. initial-excluded-subtrees: This constraint is as described in IETF RFC 5280 clause 6.1.1 item (i) • (m)1.9. path-length-constraints: This constraint indicates restrictions on the number of CA certificates in a certification path. This may need to define initial values for this or to handle such constraint differently (e.g. ignore it) • (m)1.10. policy-constraints: This constraint indicates requirements for certificate policies referenced in the certificates. This may need to define initial values for this or to handle such constraint differently (e.g. ignore it). This should also allow the ability to require a (possible set of) specific certificate policy extension value(s) in end-entity certificates (without requiring such values appearing in certificate of authorities in the certification path). 	None

Constraint(s)	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
<p>(m)2. RevocationConstraints: This set of constraints indicates requirements applicable when verifying the certificate validity status of the certificates during the certificate path validation process. These constraints may be different for different certificate types (e.g. certificates issued to signer, to CAs, to OCSP responders, to CRL Issuers, to Time-Stamping Units). Semantic for a possible set of requirement values used to express such requirements is defined as follows:</p> <p>(m)2.1. RevocationCheckingConstraints: This constraint indicates requirements for checking certificate revocation. Such constraints may specify if revocation checking is required or not and if OCSP responses or CRLs have to be used. Semantic for a possible set of requirement values used to express such requirements is defined as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • clrCheck: Checks shall be made against current CRLs (or Authority Revocation Lists); • ocsCheck: The revocation status shall be checked using OCSP IETF RFC 6960; • bothCheck: Both OCSP and CRL checks shall be carried out; • eitherCheck: Either OCSP or CRL checks shall be carried out; • noCheck: No check is mandated. 	eitherCheck
<p>(m)2.2. RevocationFreshnessConstraints: This constraint indicates time requirements on revocation information. The constraints may indicate the maximum accepted difference between the issuance date of the revocation status information of a certificate and the time of validation or require the SVA to only accept revocation information issued a certain time after the signature has been created.</p>	None
<p>(m)2.3. RevocationInfoOnExpiredCerts: This constraint mandates the signer's certificate used in validating the signature to be issued by a certification authority that keeps revocation notices for revoked certificates even after they have expired for a period exceeding a given lower bound.</p>	None
<p>(m)3. LoAOnTSPPractices: This constraint indicates the required LoA on the practices implemented by the TSP(s) having issued the certificates to be validated during the certificate path validation process, i.e. the certificates present in the certificate path of the signer's certificate, and optionally those present in all or some of the other certificate chain</p>	None
EUQualifiedCertificateRequired	Yes
EUQualifiedCertificateSigRequired	Yes
EUQualifiedCertificateSealRequired	Yes

Constraint(s)	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
EUQSCDRequired 1	Yes if using QES validation policy, no if using AdES validation policy

1. Based on Annex C from [ETSI 119 172-1]: The following constraints indicate requirements on specific certificate metadata whose semantic applies in the context of the EU legislation:

- a) EUQualifiedCertificateRequired: This constraint indicates that the signer's certificate used in validating the signature is required to be a qualified certificate as defined in the applicable EU legislation; expressed as a boolean.
- b) EUQualifiedCertificateSigRequired: This constraint indicates that the signer's certificate used in validating the signature is required to be a qualified certificate for electronic signature as defined in [eIDAS]; expressed as a boolean.
- c) EUQualifiedCertificateSealRequired: This constraint indicates that the signer's certificate used in validating the signature is required to be a qualified certificate for electronic seal as defined in [eIDAS]; expressed as a boolean.
- d) EUQSCDRequired: This constraint indicates that the signer's certificate used in validating the signature is required to be related to private key which is stored in Qualified Signature Creation Device as defined in [eIDAS]; expressed as a boolean.

Cryptographic Constraints

Dokobit validation service supports following cryptographic constraints which indicate requirements on algorithms and parameters used when creating signatures or used when validating signed object as specified in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [ETSI 119 172-1], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 row p.

Constraint(s)	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
(p)1. CryptographicSuitesConstraints: This constraint indicates requirements on algorithms and parameters used when creating signatures or used when validating signed objects included in the validation or augmenting process (e.g. signature, certificates, CRLs, OCSP responses, time-stamps). They will be typically be represented by a list of entries as in table A.3.	Based on ETSI TS 119 312 [ETSI 119 312]

Signature and Seal Elements Constraints

Dokobit validation service supports following signature elements constraints which indicate requirements on the DTBS as specified in ETSI TS 119 172-1 [ETSI 119 172-1], clause A.4.2.1, table A.2 row b.

Constraint(s)	Constraint value at signature validation (SVA or DA)
(b)1. ConstraintOnDTBS: This constraint indicates requirements on the type of the data to be signed by the signer.	None
(b)2. ContentRelatedConstraintsAsPartOfSignatureElements: This set of constraints indicate the required content related information elements under the form of signed or unsigned qualifying properties that are mandated to be present in the signature. This includes: (b)2.1 MandatedSignedQProperties-DataObjectFormat to require a specific format for the content being signed by the signer. (b)2.2 MandatedSignedQProperties-content-hints to require specific information that describes the innermost signed content of a multi-layer message where one content is encapsulated in another for the content being signed by the signer. (b)2.3 MandatedSignedQProperties-content-reference to require the incorporation of information on the way to link request and reply messages in an exchange between two parties, or the way such link has to be done, etc. (b)2.4 MandatedSignedQProperties-content-identifier to require the presence of, and optionally a specific value for, an identifier that can be used later on in the sig	None
(b)3. DOTBSAsAWholeOrInParts: This constraint indicates whether the whole data or only certain part(s) of it have to be signed. Semantic for a possible set of requirement values used to express such requirements is defined as follows: • whole: the whole data has to be signed; • parts: only certain part(s) of the data have to be signed. In this case, additional information should be used to express which parts have to be signed.	None

4.2 Signature validation protocol requirements

The communication channel between the client and the validation service transports the validation requests for the electronic signature in one direction and returns the response. It can be either synchronous or asynchronous. The validation protocol corresponds to ETSI EN 119 442.

Dokobit signature validation services are available at these means:

- as a REST API integration (Dokobit Gateway or Dokobit Validation Service API);

- as a User Interface (Dokobit portal).

4.3 Interfaces

4.3.1 Communication channel

The communication channel between the client and the SVSP is secured by using a reliably protected channel under HTTPS protocol and using TLS security channel. SVSP guarantees that it can establish a secure channel with the client and keep the confidentiality of data.

Dokobit portal requires a client to authenticate to the service using electronic identification means and only then the client can access validation service, therefore it ensures that uploaded information is accessible only for a particular client.

Dokobit Gateway and Dokobit Validation Service API require the user to authorize using authorization access token, which ensures that uploaded information is accessible only for a particular client. IP protection can be used as well.

4.3.2 SVSP - Other Trust Service Providers

The signature verification status and the signature validation report may be affected by the practices, policies and agreements for compliance with other service providers that are out outside the control of the SVSP.

Other trust service providers include time-stamping authorities, CRL and OCSP providers, other validation service providers. SVSP provided signature verification status and the signature validation report is only valid at the actual validation time.

The communication channel between the SVSP and other TSP is outside the scope of this document.

4.4 Signature validation report requirements

SVSP provides three types of validation reports:

1. Simple Validation Report - It provides necessary information regarding Signer's identity and the status indication per validated signature, including sub-indication.
2. Detailed Validation Report - It provides a report on each of the validation constraints that is processed including any validation constraints that have been applied implicitly by the implementation.
3. Machine-readable Validation Report - It provides a detailed validation report in machine-readable XML format.

All validation reports provided by SVSP shall be sealed using Advanced Electronic Seal with Qualified Certificate.

Qualified Certificate for Seal is issued by Qualified Trust Service Provider - SK ID Solutions - in accordance with SK ID Solutions Certification Practice Statement for KLASS3-SK - SK-CPS-KLASS3-v8.0 which is available at https://www.sk.ee/upload/files/SK-CPS-KLASS3-EN-v8_0_20190815.pdf.

Seal certificate details:

cn=Dokobit Qualified Validation Service

o=Dokobit UAB

c=LT

l=Vilnius

st=Vilnius

serialNumber=301549834

2.5.4.97=NTRLT-301549834

Issuer details:

cn=KLASS3-SK 2016

2.5.4.97=NTREE-10747013

ou=Sertifitseerimisteenused

o=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus

c=EE